Measurement of Fiscal Rules: Introducing the Application of

Partially Ordered Set (POSET) Theory by Badinger, Harald & Reuter, Wolf Heinrich
ePubWU Institutional Repository
Harald Badinger and Wolf Heinrich Reuter
Measurement of Fiscal Rules: Introducing the Application of Partially
Ordered Set (POSET) Theory
Article (Submitted)
(Refereed)
Original Citation:
Badinger, Harald and Reuter, Wolf Heinrich (2015) Measurement of Fiscal Rules: Introducing the
Application of Partially Ordered Set (POSET) Theory. Journal of Macroeconomics, 43. pp. 108-123.
ISSN 0164-0704
This version is available at: http://epub.wu.ac.at/4435/
Available in ePubWU: December 2014
ePubWU, the institutional repository of the WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, is
provided by the University Library and the IT-Services. The aim is to enable open access to the
scholarly output of the WU.
This document is the version that has been submitted to a publisher.
http://epub.wu.ac.at/
Measurement of Fiscal Rules: Introducing the Application of
Partially Ordered Set (POSET) TheoryI
Harald BADINGERa,b,∗, Wolf Heinrich REUTERa
aVienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics, Welthandelsplatz 1, 1020
Vienna, Austria
bAustrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), Arsenal, Objekt 20, 1030 Vienna, Austria
Abstract
Data on (economic) institutions are often available only as observations on ordinal, inher-
ently incomparable properties, which are then typically aggregated to a composite index
in the empirical social science literature. From a methodological perspective, the present
paper advocates the application of partially ordered set (POSET) theory as an alterna-
tive approach. Its main virtue is that it takes the ordinal nature of the data seriously
and dispenses with the unavoidably subjective assignment of weights to incomparable
properties, maintains a high standard of objectivity, and can be applied in various fields
of economics. As an application, the POSET approach is then used to calculate new
indices on the stringency of fiscal rules for 81 countries over the period 1985 to 2012
based on recent data by the IMF (2012). The derived measures of fiscal rules are used
to test their significance for public finances in a fiscal reaction function and compare the
POSET with the composite index approach.
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1. Introduction
The recent financial and economic crisis, in highlighting the fiscal profligacy of many
governments during the pre-crisis period, has led to a revival of both the public and
academic debate on whether policy makers should be constrained in their discretion.
The political-economic rationale underlying the present discussion is well understood:
‘Fiscal profligacy occurs because politicians find it politically optimal given
the constraints and pressures they face. It will continue as long as the same
pressures and constraints are in place. Restoring fiscal discipline therefore
requires . . . adopting institutions that bind the budgetary process.’ (Wyplosz,
2010, p. 35)
From a theoretical perspective it is well established that (fiscal) institutions affect (fiscal)
policy outcomes (Persson et al., 1997, 2004; Poterba and von Hagen, 1999; Debrun and
Kumar, 2007). And while there is also some evidence on the effects of fiscal rules on
fiscal policy (e.g., Fatás and Mihov, 2006; Krogstrup and Wälti, 2008; IMF, 2009), an
open issue and key difficulty in the empirical literature is the lack of an objective, widely
accepted approach to measure (the stringency of) fiscal rules.
Fiscal rules can be described by numerous properties in terms of both legislative
acts and informal agreements, which are typically ordinal in nature and not comparable
with each other. This requires a choice of which characteristics to use and – if they are
aggregated into one composite index as it is common in this strand of the literature –
how to assign (cardinal) values and weights to particular properties. The unavoidably
high degree of subjectivity and wide variety of measures used is likely to be one key
reason for the partly conflicting results in the literature and the lack of consensus on the
optimal design of fiscal rules.
The present paper suggests, as an alternative approach to construct measures of fiscal
rules, the use of partially ordered set (POSET) theory, which is well established in the
natural and technical sciences, but has – to the best of our knowledge – not been applied
in the empirical economics literature so far.1 The attractivity of the POSET approach
is that it builds on well-established mathematical concepts, fully exploits all information
contained in the data and reduces the need for subjective choice to a minimum.
In particular, the purpose of this paper is threefold. First, it introduces POSET
theory as an alternative to the widely used index function approach. Although this
choice is motivated by the subject of the present paper and the nature of (data on) fiscal
rules, we argue that the POSET approach is an useful alternative in other applied fields
of the social sciences as well.
1 In the economics literature POSET theory has been employed in very different contexts, e.g., for the
computation of winning strategies in game theory (Soltys and Wilson, 2011) or for the derivation of
supermodularity and preferences in utility theory (Chambers and Echenique, 2009).
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Second, the POSET approach is used to construct various measures of numerical fiscal
rules based on data from IMF (2012), which contains information on the properties of
fiscal regimes for 81 countries dating back to 1985. Third, these POSET indices are used
to investigate the effect of fiscal frameworks on public finances and thereby compare fiscal
rules indices derived by the composite index and the POSET approach, respectively.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review
of the literature on fiscal rules with a focus on the measurement of fiscal frameworks.
Section 3 discusses issues in constructing measures of fiscal rules and makes the case
for the use of partial order set (POSET) theory to rank countries according to their
(stringency of) fiscal rules. Section 4 makes use of recent IMF data to calculate POSET
indices of fiscal rules for 81 countries over the period 1985-2012. Section 5 uses the
indices of fiscal rules as explanatory variable in a fiscal reaction function and compares
the results from the POSET approach with those from a composite index approach.
Section 6 summarizes the results and concludes.
2. Measures of Fiscal Rules: Previous Studies
There is a large theoretical literature, motivating the need for constraining fiscal
policy discretion by fiscal rules. The main arguments relate to market failures and
incentive structures that create a deficit bias of policy makers (common pool problem,
information asymmetry, short-sightedness of policy makers, political competition and
outside pressures). Another argument for binding the budgetary process has been put
forward by Fatás and Mihov (2003, 2006), who argue that fiscal constraints lead to lower
volatility of discretionary fiscal policy, lower output volatility and thereby enhanced
economic growth.
Regarding the potential downsides of (possibly too stringent) fiscal rules, Blanchard
and Giavazzi (2004) and Beetsma and Debrun (2007) point to the tradeoff between
sufficient government investment (spending) and the requirement of low deficits imposed
by budgetary rules. Manasse (2005) discusses the tradeoff between reducing the deficit
bias and the cost of foregone stabilization.
There is also large empirical literature, investigating the effects of fiscal rules on fiscal
outcomes. The interest in assessing the effects of alternative fiscal institutions and their
impact on public finance has been growing in the last decade, following the consolidation
efforts in the aftermath of the economic and financial crisis and the subsequent European
debt crisis. As a result, fiscal consolidation has become a major objective of governments
and the European Union (EU) institutions that took measures like the re-formulation of
the Stability and Growth Pact and the implementation of the Fiscal Compact in order
to regulate and strengthen the stability of the member countries’ budgets.
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The present paper does not aim at providing a comprehensive survey of the volumi-
nous theoretical and empirical literature.2 Rather, we review a few well known papers
that are also representative of the approaches that have been used in previous studies
for the measurement of fiscal frameworks.
Some of the studies use dummy variables indicating the existence of (specific features
of) fiscal rules (e.g., Guichard et al., 2007; Brzozowski and Siwinska-Gorzelak, 2010;
Galí and Perotti, 2003). These studies use binary variables to indicate if a country
has a specific type or design of rule (balanced budget rule, golden rule, debt rule in
law or constitution, etc.) in force and/or test for structural breaks at the year of the
introduction of the fiscal rule. In most studies, the dummy variables indicating the
existence of fiscal rules turn out to be significant in various empirical settings using fiscal
performance measures as dependent variable (such as the primary balance, fiscal policy
volatility, or the debt level). While these results are suggestive and binary variables are
valuable tools in econometric analyses, their informational content (and the number of
dummy variables that can be included) is limited and they might be prone to capture
the effects of other (omitted) variables.
Most studies on fiscal rules rely on an index function approach, where alternative
properties related to the stringency of fiscal rules are numerically evaluated (ranked)
and aggregated into a composite index, typically by calculating a weighted average (e.g.,
Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1987; Alesina et al., 1999; Debrun
et al., 2008).3 This strand of studies typically calculates indices using data from surveys
among practitioners or officals of international organisations. Indices can be based on
five different questions (properties) as, e.g., in Debrun et al. (2008), or on more than
20 properties as, e.g., in von Hagen (1992); the selection and weighting of the various
categories (groups of questions) is based on by the judgment of the authors. And while
these studies are suggestive and point to a significant role of fiscal rules indices on public
finances, the composite index approach has some limitations that will be discussed in the
next section.
3. Measuring Fiscal Rules: Methodological Issues
As indicated in Section 2, there is a large variation in the measures of fiscal rules
employed in the literature, reflecting the difficulties to quantify institutional arrange-
ments. This is a shortcoming, and a more widely accepted approach to measure fiscal
2 A review of the theoretical arguments for and against fiscal rules is given by Wyplosz (2012) and IMF
(2009). A descriptive overview of fiscal regimes and rules is given by Schaechter et al. (2012).
3 Such an index function approach is widely used in economics to consolidate information and to allow
numerical analyses; examples are composite indices measuring corruption, economic freedom, the rule
of law, central bank independence, or the degree of federalism.
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rules seems warranted to estimate their determinants (and their effects on fiscal perfor-
mance), to enable a comparison of alternative studies, and to derive policy conclusions
on the optimal, i.e., most effective and efficient design of fiscal rules.
3.1. General Considerations
There are several issues in the construction of composite indices.4 Generally, there
are three stages which need subjective decisions: i) the selection of the objects and the
relevant properties, ii) the assignment of weights to each of the properties, and iii) the
aggregation technique used to combine the individual properties.
The choice of objects and properties is less controversial; it often arises directly from
economic theory and is typically also determined by (restrictions on) data availability.
Assigning weights to and thereby judging the relative importance of specific properties
is more critical.5 Moreover, the numerical valuation properties (that are often ordinal in
nature) and their scaling are more or less arbitrary and different approaches can imply
very different outcomes (Maggino and Fattore, 2011). Finally, the aggregation process
is problematic since it assumes the existence of compensations and trade-offs among
(typically) incomparable properties.
These arguments do often apply to empirical studies in the social sciences and they do
specifically apply to the measurement of fiscal rules, which can be described by numerous
properties in terms of both legislative acts and informal agreements, which are difficult
or impossible to quantify and can typically only be expressed in ordinal terms.
To overcome these difficulties, the present paper suggests the use of partially or-
dered set (POSET) theory as an alternative approach that has not been used in the
construction of measures of fiscal rules so far. Its virtue is that it fully exploits all the
available information, takes the ordinal nature of the data seriously and does not require
a subjective choice of weights and the aggregation technique.
The use of POSET theory is well established in the natural and technical sciences. It
has been employed, e.g., in order to rank chemicals according to environmental hazards
(Halfon and Reggiani, 1986), for the ranking of near-shore sediments (Brüggemann et al.,
2001), to evaluate the quality of air pollutant monitoring systems (Voigt et al., 2004) or
to explore patterns of habitat diversity across US landscapes (Myers et al., 2006). In the
next section we outline the theoretical concepts underlying the POSET approach.
4 Freudenberg and Nardo (2003) provide a critical review of the construction and use of composite
indices in the social science literature.
5 Sometimes such a choice can be theoretically motivated, e.g., when an objective function of the policy
maker can be defined. To reduce the degree of arbitrariness in the choice of weights, techniques like
correlation, principal component, or data envelopment analysis have been used.
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3.2. Partially Ordered Set (POSET) Theory
3.2.1. Basic Definitions
In the following we outline the construction of ranking indices using partial order set
theory, based on Brüggemann and Patil (2010) and De Loof et al. (2008).
Definition 1. The set O consists of i = 1, . . . , N objects (xi ∈ O) which can be described
by j = 1, . . . , J properties: q(xi) = (q1(xi), q2(xi), . . . , qJ(xi)), where qj(xi) ∈ Qj ∀j. On
each set of different properties Qj a linear order relation ≤Qj is defined. A linear order
relation is reflexive, anti-symmetric, transitive and every two elements are comparable.
Definition 1 formalizes that an object xi ∈ O, e.g., a country, can be described by J
ordinal properties qj(xi). Without loss of generality, we assume that the sets of possible
properties Qj are subsets of the integer values, since any property, on which a linear
order relation is defined, can be mapped into a set of integer values, as long as the
integer values are interpreted strictly in ordinal terms.
For illustration, consider an example with seven objects (x1, . . . , x7), which are all
described by three different properties q1(xi), q2(xi), and q3(xi). In the context of the
present paper, which considers the measurement of the stringency of fiscal rules as an
application, the objects could be countries (or states); property q1(xi) could be a binary
variable indicating whether enforcement mechanisms or transparency requirements mon-
itored by an independent body do exist (2) or do not exist (1). Property q2(xi) could
refer to the legal foundation, i.e., whether the fiscal rule is embedded in the constitution,
whether it is statutory, or just provisional in terms of an informal agreement among or
commitment by policymakers. Finally, property q3(xi) might reflect a numerical limit
on some fiscal performance measure, e.g., the (cyclically adjusted) deficit in % of GDP.
Properties q1(xi) and q2(xi) are measured on an ordinal scale, whereas property q3(xi) is
measured on an interval scale. Nevertheless, on each set of the properties a linear order
relation (relating to the stringency of the fiscal rule) can be defined as follows:
Q1 . . . 1 ≤Q1 2,
Q2 . . . provisional ≤Q2 legal ≤Q2 constitutional,
Q3 . . . 3% ≤Q3 1% ≤Q3 0%.
Within each of the properties the ordering of the objects is clear, but when institutions
(such as fiscal frameworks) of the objects are described by more than one property, the
problem arises that different properties (per se) may imply different rankings. Let the
seven objects considered have the following values for the three properties:
q(x1) = (2, legal, 0%) q(x2) = (2, constitutional, 1%) q(x3) = (2, legal, 1%)
q(x4) = (2,provisional, 1%) q(x5) = (1, legal, 3%) q(x6) = (1,provisional, 1%)
q(x7) = (1,provisional, 3%)
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Figure 1: Hasse Diagram of POSET Example
While it is clear that there is no country with a fiscal regime that is less stringent than
the one of country x7 (regardless, which of the three properties is considered), country
x1 is less stringent than country x2 in terms of property q2, whereas in terms of property
q3, the order is reversed; hence; countries x1 and x2 are incomparable.
To address the problem of incomparable objects, the POSET approach uses the notion
of a partially ordered set and the concept of a linear extension of a set:
Definition 2. A partially ordered set (POSET) is a couple (O,≤O) of a set of objects
O with a corresponding binary partial order relation ≤O. Object xi ∈ O is said to be
‘smaller than or equal to’ object xi′ ∈ O, written as xi ≤O xi′ , if qj(xi) ≤Qj qj(xi′) ∀j.
Otherwise the objects are said to be ‘incomparable objects of the POSET’, written as
xi||Oxi′ .
According to Definition 2 an object can only be said to be smaller than (or equal to)
another object if all properties of the first object are smaller than (or equal to) all
properties of the second object (in their respective ordinal ranking).
A partially ordered set (O,≤O) can be depicted using a so called Hasse diagram. The
diagram connects objects by lines such that if xi ≤O xi′ there has to be a sequence of
connected objects upwards from xi to xi′ , otherwise the objects are incomparable (and
hence unconnected in the diagram). In the present example, the Hasse diagram for the
seven objects is illustrated in Figure 1.
Let us now define the concept of a linear extension of a set, which is crucial in the
treatment of incomparable objects:
Definition 3. A linear extension of the set O is one permutation of the objects of
O ≡ (x1, x2, . . . , xn), such that xi <O xi′ implies ri < ri′ , where ri and ri′ are the ranks
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Figure 2: Linear Extensions of POSET Example
of objects xi and xi′ respectively. The set of all linear extensions of the POSET (O,≤O)
is denoted as ε(O).
Hence, every linear extension represents one possible ranking of the objects which obeys
the POSET, i.e., each permutation changes the positions of incomparable objects but
preserves the ordering of comparable objects. All six possible linear extensions of the
above example are illustrated in Figure 2. As can be seen, country x7, the least stringent
one, always appears on the bottom. In contrast, countries x1 and x2, the two most
stringent ones, always appear on top. However, since x1 and x2 are incomparable, both
orderings have to be considered, i.e., x1 above x2 (upper panel), and x2 above x1 (lower
panel). Analogous arguments yield the alternative arrangements of the other countries
in the six linear extensions.
The set of all linear extensions is the set of all possible rankings (obeying the POSET)
of the objects under examination. Without further information, it is natural to assume
that all linear extensions have the same probability and are thus uniformly distributed
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over the interval [0, |ε(O)|].6 This allows us to define a rank probability for each rank of
an object.
Definition 4. The number of linear extensions in ε(O) with the specific object xi ∈ O
on rank r ∈ [1, n], referred to as |εri (O)|, divided by the cardinality of ε(O) (the number
of its elements) is called the rank probability of object xi on rank r: pi(r) = |εriO|/|ε(O)|.
By construction, it holds that
∑N
r=1 pi(r) = 1. The expected value of the rank of an object
xi ∈ O, also referred to as averaged rank (r¯i), is given by
r¯i =
N∑
r=1
[r · pi(r)] (1)
For convenience, and w.l.o.g. for our empirical analysis, the averaged ranks, ranging from
potentially 1 to N , will be normalized to take values between zero and one. Relating the
POSET to the index function approach, the latter is a very special case of the former in
the sense that each ranking implied by a particular weighting scheme in an index function
corresponds to exactly one particular linear extension of the POSET (Brüggemann et al.,
2001).7
In the above example the averaged ranks for each of the objects are r¯1 = 1.5, r¯2 = 1.5,
r¯3 = 3, r¯4 = 4.33, r¯5 = 5, r¯6 = 5.66, r¯7 = 7, which gives normalized indices of r¯I1 = 0.21,
r¯I2 = 0.21, r¯I3 = 0.43, r¯I4 = 0.62, r¯I5 = 0.71, r¯I6 = 0.81, r¯I7 = 1.
Essentially, the only subjective choice in the POSET framework is the set of properties
considered. As a consequence, it is of particular interest to assess the stability of the
POSET indices against excluding or adding properties. To identify the most influential
properties, summary measures for the implied changes in terms of the average ranks
(Brüggemann and Patil, 2010) and the implied change in the number of incomparabilities
(Brüggemann and Voigt, 1996) have been suggested in the literature. Elaborating on the
alternative approaches available is beyond the scope of the present paper; a discussion is
given in Brüggemann and Patil (2010).
Another important advantage of the POSET approach is related to the handling
of missing values or uninformative data (such as answers in the categories ‘other’ in
survey data). On the one hand, excluding objects where information on one (or a few
properties) is missing would significantly reduce the sample size; on the other hand,
excluding properties where data is available only for a subset of objects would imply
a substantial loss of information. The POSET approach - unlike an index function
approach - allows to account for properties (e.g., a particular question in a survey) where
information (the answer) is missing for a subset of the countries. In this sense the
6 | · | stands for the cardinality of a set, i.e., the number of its elements.
7 More precisely, the POSET is related by an order preserving map to the ordered set implied by the
index function.
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POSET approach fully exploits and makes best use of the available information provided
by the (sub)set of observed properties and dispenses with the need to drop objects (or
properties) where part of the information is missing.
The reason is that the POSET approach is based on a pair-wise comparison of coun-
tries. E.g., if two countries A and B have responded to a question, this question is
used for the comparison of the two countries. If one of the countries (e.g., A) has not
responded (or responded uninformatively), this question is dropped for the comparison
of country A with country B (and other countries), but the question is still used for
comparing country B with other countries (which have also responded to the respective
question).8
3.2.2. A Simple Extension
The standard approach in the POSET literature is to calculate the averaged rank of
the objects, given the set of observed objects. A drawback of this approach is that it
depends on the particular sample of objects at hand. In other words, the interpretation
of the averaged rank as expected value rests on the assumption that the set of linear
extensions from a given sample corresponds to the population.
In applied work, in particular in the social sciences, there might be further unobserved
objects, and hence further possible linear extensions, such that the averaged rank defined
above is then based on a subset of the population only, and may thus be interpreted as
a (possibly biased) estimate of the expected value, given the set of all possible objects.
To address this (possible) selection bias of the standard approach, under which the
ranking of each object depends on the sample of objects (which could be only a subset
of existing objects, e.g., due to data availability), we suggest a straightforward extension
of the calculation of the averaged rank that takes into account all possible objects (even
those which might not be observed in a particular application).
Definition 5. Let G be the ‘full’ (hypothetical) POSET, including objects g ∈ G with
all combinations of values of the properties qj(g) from the set of possible values Qj,
i.e., G = {g|q(g) = (q1(g), q2(g), . . . , qJ(g), with qj(g) ∈ Qj ∀j}.9 The rank probability
of element xi on rank r in all linear extensions of this full POSET ε(G) is defined as
8 As outlined in Section 3.2.3, object x1 ‘is smaller or equal than’ object x2 with the properties q(xi) =
(q1(xi), q2(xi), . . . , qJ (xi)) if qj(x1) ≤Qj qj(x2), ∀j. In case of missing observations this definition is
slightly augmented in the sense that it needs to hold only for the set of properties on which data is
available for both countries, i.e. ∀j : ∃qj(x1) ∧ ∃qj(x2).
9 Obviously, the set of objects under consideration O is a subset of G, i.e. O ⊆ G. Also notice, that
we make the reasonable assumption that the set of all possible values Qj is the set of values actually
observed for each property qj . On an ordinal scale, there would be arbitrarily many additional values
(below, above, and in between the observed values), yielding a (useless) ‘full’ POSET with an infinite
number of elements.
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p˜i(r) = |εri (G)|/|ε(G)|, and the corresponding expected value of the rank (r˜i) is given by
r˜i =
N∑
r=1
[r · p˜i(r)] (2)
Again the averaged ranks will be rescaled to an index between zero and one w.l.o.g. for
our empirical analysis.
Figure 3 shows the Hasse diagram for the ‘full’ (hypothetical) POSET of the above
example including not only the seven observed objects (underlined in the figure), but
additionally all 11 other objects that can be created using (all combinations of) the
observed values of the three properties q1, q2, and q3. Again the linear extensions for
this ‘full’ POSET can be created and then an averaged rank can be calculated for each
object in the ‘full’ POSET. It is clear that each of the original objects under investigation
in our example is also included in this ‘full’ POSET and the averaged ranks for these
can be obtained also for the ‘full’ POSET. In our example the averaged ranks would be:
r˜1 = 2.71, r˜2 = 2.71, r˜3 = 6.33, r˜4 = 11.40, r˜5 = 16.29, r˜6 = 16.29, r˜7 = 18, which gives
normalized indices of r˜I1 = 0.15, r˜I2 = 0.15, r˜I3 = 0.35, r˜I4 = 0.63, r˜I5 = 0.91, r˜I6 = 0.91,
r˜I7 = 1. As can be seen, the relative ordering among the objects is preserved under this
more general approach, whereas the scaling (i.e., the distances among the objects in the
unit interval) is slightly altered depending on how many hypothetical objects ‘enter the
picture between’ the observed objects.10
3.2.3. Computation
A potential complication is that the calculation of POSET indices can be computa-
tional cumbersome (or even infeasible). Determining the number of all linear extensions
of a POSET and enumerating them has been studied intensively (see De Loof et al.,
2008, for a survey). With more than N = 25 objects the needed run time of today’s
computer programs exceeds any feasible number, since the number of linear extensions
increases exponentially with the number of objects (Brüggemann et al., 2004).11 To
address this computational issue alternative solutions have been suggested. Lerche and
Sorensen (2003) use random sampling, whereas De Loof et al. (2006) develop a method
based on lattice theory.
In the present paper, we use the approach by Brüggemann et al. (2004), who derive a
closed form solution for the (approximate) averaged rank of objects of a POSET, using
10In the present example, this is immaterial: the correlation between the two indices amounts to 0.97
(and the rank correlation is 1). More generally (with more objects and properties), there could be
larger differences that might be relevant, e.g., if the indices are used in regression analyses.
11De Loof et al. (2006) have shown that enumerating all linear extensions is a complexity problem in the
class of counting problems similar to the NP-class for decision problems, from which it follows that
the problem can be solved in polynomial time.
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Figure 3: Full POSET Example
Local Partial Order Model techniques. It is derived from the following considerations:
The rank of object xi ∈ O in any linear extension ε(O) lies within the closed range:
ri ∈ [Pi + 1, Pi + 1 + Ui], where Pi is the number of predecessors to (number of objects
ranked above) xi, i.e. the cardinality of the set {xj ∈ O : xj >o xi}, and Ui the number
of objects incomparable to xi, i.e. the cardinality of the set {xj ∈ O : xj ||oxi}.
The actual averaged rank now depends on the distribution of the incomparable ob-
jects. In the extreme case r(xi) = Pi + 1 all the incomparable objects are placed
among the successors of (objects ranked below) object xi, and in the other extreme
case ri = Pi + 1 + Ui all the incomparable objects are placed among the predecessors.
For ranks in-between, we see that if ri = Pi + 1 + k then k objects are placed among the
predecessors and Ui − k objects are placed among the successors. This rank is realized(
Ui
k
)
(Pi + 1)k(Si + 1)Ui−k times, which counts all possibilities to place k objects among
the predecessors and Ui − k objects among the successors of xi (Si). This yields the
following formula for the averaged rank of an object:
r¯i =
∑Ui
k=0(Pi + 1 + k) ·
(
Ui
k
) · (Pi + 1)k · (Si + 1)Ui−k∑Ui
k=0
(
Ui
k
) · (Pi + 1)k · (Si + 1)Ui−k (3)
One can think of examples where Equation (3) performs less well, e.g., if the POSET is
very asymmetric or includes objects which are incomparable to all other objects. How-
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ever, in POSET with a large number of objects and a roughly symmetric structure - as
will be the case if we consider the full hypothetical POSET of all possible object (see
Section 3.2.2, Definition 5), the formula gives a good approximation of the exact averaged
rank.
The calculation of the successor or predecessor object counts (Pi, Si), required for
implementing Equation (3) is generally cumbersome and time consuming, as the algo-
rithm needs to compare each of the objects with all others to determine the (number of)
succeeding and preceding objects. The use of the ‘full’ (hypothetical) POSET with all
possible objects facilitates the calculation. To see that, project the ordered set of the
properties Qj on the interval IQj := [1, nQj ] preserving the ordinal ranking, with nQj
being the number of values in set Qj for property j and representing the highest value in
Qj . Now the value qj(xi) of object xi for property j has a scalar representation nqj(xi)
in the interval IQj , which is true for every property of object xi. Hence, in the ‘full’
(hypothetical) POSET, the number of predecessor objects Pi of xi can be calculated as
Pi =
∏
j(nQj − nqj(xi) + 1) − 1 and the number of successor objects can then be cal-
culated as Si =
∏
j nqj(xi) − 1. It follows that the number of incomparable objects is
Uxi =
∏
j nQj − Pxi − Sxi − 1.
4. Application I: Measuring Fiscal Rules in 81 Countries
4.1. Data
In the following we calculate POSET indices of fiscal rules, using data from the
IMF Fiscal Rules Datset (IMF, 2012). The data were assembled by the IMF based on
primary sources (legislation, published and unpublished country documents, the fiscal
rules database of the European Commission, 2010) and interviews with country officials.
The IMF dataset covers 81 countries over the period 1985 to 2012 and provides
information on supranational as well as national numerical fiscal rules covering at least
the central government. For the most recent period in the sample fiscal rules are included
if they have already taken effect or clear transition schemes are specified. In the following
we concentrate on national fiscal rules, which have already come into force.
We do not explicitly consider supranational rules. To the (often large) extent that
these supranational fiscal rules have been transposed into and implemented in national
law, they will be included in the information on national fiscal rules anyway. Moreover,
the measurement error from ignoring supranational rules would only pose a problem
in the empirical models if it was systematically related to other explanatory variables
included.12
12The most relevant set of supranational rules in our sample of 81 countries relates to the EU (Eurozone)
countries (a large part of which is implemented in national law). This suggests exploring the sensitivity
of the results against including dummies for (EU) euro area countries in empirical models including
the POSET indices.
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Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview of the data on fiscal rules used in the present
paper. A detailed description of the IMF dataset is given by Schaechter et al. (2012).
Table 1: Numerical Fiscal Rules Across Countries, 1985-2012
Fiscal Rule(s) in Place % of countries % of total observa-
tions
BR 44% 27%
DR 31% 16%
ER 35% 12%
RR 9% 7%
BR + DR 19% 6%
BR + ER 17% 6%
BR + RR 2% 1%
DR + ER 11% 3%
DR + RR 4% 2%
ER + RR 7% 2%
BR + DR + ER 5% 1) 1%
BR + DR + RR 1% 2) 1%
DR + ER + RR 2% 3) 0%
BR + DR + ER+ RR 1% 4) 0%
Notes: Data source is (IMF, 2012). BR . . . Balanced Budget Rule, DR. . . Debt Rule, ER
. . . Expenditure Rule, RR . . . Revenue Rule. The first column reports that share of countries
where the respective fiscal rule has been in place in at least one year. The second column
reports the share of observations (in the total number of observations) where the respective
fiscal rule has been in place. 1) Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Finland; 2) Australia; 3)
Australia, Lithuania; 4) Australia.
The database covers four different types of numerical fiscal rules: Balanced budget rules
(BR), debt rules (DR), expenditure rules (ER), and revenue rules (RR). Generally, there
has been an increase in the use of fiscal rules over time; whereas only 5% of the 81
countries had fiscal rules in place in 1985, this share has increased to 15% in 1995 and
56% in the most recent period (2012). It is worth mentioning that expenditure rules
have only been put in place mainly in the most recent years.
As can be seen from Table 1, approximately half the countries in our sample (44%)
have some kind of balanced budget rule in place, 35% have an expenditure rule, and
31% a debt rule. Revenue rules are rare and used in only in a small fraction of 9% of
the countries (and will thus not be considered separately in our econometric analysis).
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Several countries have more than one rule in place; the combination of a balanced budget
rule with either a debt or an expenditure rule is most common. Australia is the only
country which had (and still has) all four types of rules in place.
For each type of numerical fiscal rule the dataset provides information about the legal
basis, coverage, enforcement procedure, monitoring of compliance, and escape clauses.
In addition, general information on the fiscal framework in place is available, relating
to the existence of multi-year expenditure ceilings, independent bodies for monitoring
or assumptions of budget forecasts, and to the transparency and flexibility of the fiscal
rules. Table 2 gives an overview of the variables describing the properties of fiscal rules
and their sets of possible values, along with their distribution across countries.
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Table 2: Properties of Fiscal Rules, 81 Countries, 1985-2012
Variable Characteristics All BR DR ER RR
Rule-Type Specific Information
Legal basis Constitutional 6% 9% 6% 0% 9%
Statutory 51% 58% 52% 45% 24%
Coalition agreement 24% 20% 25% 28% 29%
Political commitment 20% 13% 17% 28% 38%
Coverage General government 43% 44% 47% 39% 43%
Simil. rules for diff. levels 2% 0% 0% 6% 0%
Central government 55% 56% 54% 55% 57%
Formal enforcement Exists 24% 23% 19% 28% 40%
procedure Does not exists 76% 78% 81% 72% 60%
Monitoring of compli- Exists 27% 26% 31% 25% 26%
ance outside govern-
ment
Does not exists 73% 74% 69% 75% 74%
Well-specified escape In place 15% 20% 14% 10% 13%
clause Not in place 85% 80% 86% 90% 87%
General Information on Fiscal Framework
Multi-year expenditure By line item 1%
ceilings By ministry 5%
Aggregate 25%
None 70%
Independent body sets In place 12%
budget assumptions Not in place 88%
Independent body In place 10%
monitors implementa-
tion
Not in place 90%
Fiscal responsibility
laws
In place 29%
(transp., accountabil-
ity)
Not in place 71%
Budget balance target
in
In place 29%
cylically adjusted terms Partly in place 5%
or over the cycle Not in place 66%
Rule(s) exclude public Do 27%
investment or other Some rules do 16%
priority items Do not 57%
Notes: Data source is (IMF, 2012). Percentage corresponds to share of total observations
where fiscal rule with respective characteristic has been in place.
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Only a few countries have constitutional fiscal rules; approximately half of them are
enshrined in national law and the other half in coalitional or political agreements. Overall,
balanced budget rules do have a stronger legal foundation, while expenditure and revenue
rules are only agreed upon in coalitional or political commitments in the majority of the
countries (and years). A formal enforcement mechanism or outside monitoring exists for
only a quarter of the numerical fiscal rules, well-specified escape clauses are even rarer.
Regarding general institutional arrangements, about a third of the countries has
multi-year expenditure ceilings and transparency and accountability rules in place. On
the other hand in only approximately 10% of the countries (and years), an independent
body sets the budget assumptions or monitors the budgets’ implementation. Roughly
one third of the fiscal rules are stated in cyclically adjusted or structural terms or exclude
priority items like public investment.
For our empirical analysis, we code all variables on an ordinal scale such that the
properties are ranked in increasing order of stringency, broadly defined in terms of their
hierarchy of the legal basis, coverage, and transparency and accountability. E.g., the vari-
able ‘legal basis’ takes values of 4 (constitutional), 3 (statutory), 2 (coalition agreement),
and 1 (political commitment); corresponding codings are applied to the other variables
(properties) listed in the leftmost column of Table 1. Hence the most stringent rules
are constitutional, have a wide coverage, involve independent institutions in the bud-
getary process (setup, implementation, monitoring of enforcement), include multi-year
expenditure ceilings, and go along with strong transparency and accountability laws.
For most properties the ranking is straightforward; only for three variables (well
defined escape clauses, definition of targets in cyclically adjusted terms, exclusion of
public investment), the ranking is unclear a priori. Hence, these properties are reported
here for completeness, but they will not be used in the construction of the POSET indices
below.
4.2. POSET Indices of Fiscal Rules
In the following, we turn to the calculation of alternative POSET indices (Definition 5,
Equation (2)) for our sample of 81 countries, using (subsets of) the variables (properties)
listed in Table 1. The choice of the properties and the definitions of the corresponding
indices are summarized in Table 3.
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Table 3: Definition of POSET Indices of Numerical Fiscal Rules
Index Description Variables
Rule-Type Specific Indices (same for DR, ER and RR)
RBR Information directly associated
with Balanced Budget Rules
Legal Basis, coverage, enforce-
ment procedure, monitoring of
compliance
RBR+ Adds general information on
fiscal framework to RBR
RBR + Multi-year expenditure
ceiling, independent body, trans-
parency and accountability
General Index
RG General information about fiscal framework
We define separate indices for each type of numerical fiscal rule: balanced budget (BR),
debt (DR), and expenditure (ER) rules. First, we create a basic index (e.g., RBR)
including the legal basis, coverage, enforcement procedures, and monitoring (see the
upper panel of Table 2) relating to the respective rule.
To capture the role of general properties of the fiscal framework (see the lower panel of
Table 1) with a clear ranking, we augment these basic indices for each type of fiscal rule by
adding variables indicating the existence of multi-year frameworks, of independent bodies
setting assumptions and monitoring performance, and transparency and accountability
laws (e.g. RBR+).
Finally, to separately capture the properties of the general fiscal framework, we define
an index (RG) that is solely based on general information (see the lower panel of Table 2).
In sum, this provides us with a total of 9 indices over the period 1985 to 2012, describing
the properties of the fiscal framework and the fiscal rules in place for our sample of 81
countries, making a total of 2, 268 observations for each index.
4.2.1. Basic results
Adopting the notation introduced above, we consider (up to) N = 81 countries,
which are to be ranked by (up to) J = 11 properties, i.e., ordinally coded values of the
characteristics of fiscal regimes summarized in Table 3. The set of possible values Qj
for the properties is a subset of the integer values that varies across variables depending
on the number of possible values, ranging from the set [1, 2] up to [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. We
emphasize once more that the properties have only an ordinal interpretation and are
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increasing in the ‘stringency’ of fiscal rules, broadly defined in terms of the hierarchy
of their legal basis, their coverage, enforcement procedures, and monitoring as well as
the existence of multi-year frameworks, of independent bodies setting assumptions and
monitoring performance, and transparency and accountability laws.
Table 4 provides summary statistics of the 9 POSET indices over the period 1985
to 2012 for our sample of 81 countries, which are calculated according to Equation (2)
based on the sets of properties in Table 3.
Table 4: Summary Statistics for POSET indices
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
RBR 0.162 0.335 0 0.996 RRR 0.028 0.151 0 0.996
RBR+ 0.157 0.325 0 1.000 RRR+ 0.028 0.150 0 0.993
RDR 0.087 0.254 0 1.000 RG 0.147 0.252 0 0.989
RDR+ 0.088 0.256 0 1.000
RER 0.097 0.264 0 0.996
RER+ 0.099 0.268 0 0.999
Correlations
RBR RDR RER RRR RG
RBR 1.00
RDR 0.30 1.00
RER 0.28 0.15 1.00
RRR 0.07 0.11 0.42 1.00
RG 0.67 0.54 0.64 0.33 1.00
As can be seen from Table 4, all POSET indices show substantial variation across coun-
tries and time and span almost the full range of possible values from 0 to 1. Figure 4
illustrates the cross-sectional variation across the POSET indices, using as two repre-
sentative examples the balanced budget rule index (RBR+) and the index of the general
framework (RG) for the year 2010. In light of the fact that only roughly half of the
countries have a fiscal rule in place, we show both the distribution of the full sample and
the corresponding plots excluding observations equal to zero.
Descriptive statistics by country group (see Table A6 in Appendix A.1) show that emerg-
ing and especially low-income countries do not have any or not very stringent fiscal rules
in place. In general the strongest rules can be found in form of balanced budget rules
in advanced countries13 and the EU27 member states. In particular, Australia, the
13Classification according to IMF.
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Figure 4: Boxplots of Selected POSET Indices, 2010
Netherlands, and Germany have the most stringent fiscal rules14; they are weakest in
Armenia, Russia and Slovakia (apart from the 28 countries for which the indices are
close to (< 0.01) or equal to zero).
Figure 5 illustrates, using averages across countries, the development of the POSET
indices over time and shows a general trend towards an increased use and stringency of
fiscal rules in the last one and a half decade.
The lower panel of Table 4 shows the correlation between selected indices: the aver-
age correlation between POSET indices based on the same information categories, i.e.
comparing the basic indices for several types of rules, is 0.22, and between the POSET
indices for the same type of rule (i.e., comparing basic and augmented index for the
same type of rule) is 0.95.15 These numbers show that the indices constructed in this
paper overall do in fact measure different aspects of the budgetary process, and that a
high stringency in one type of rule does not necessarily imply a high degree of stringency
in other rules. Hence, apart from the large variation in the stringency of rules across
countries, there is also large variation within the set of countries with relatively stringent
rules. Finally, the average correlation between the rule specific indices and the index
14Measured as average over the full sample period (1985-2012) and over the indices for the four types
of rules RBR+, RER+, RDR+, and RRR+.
15This is not too surprising, since the set of questions for the basic and augmented indices overlap to a
large extent.
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Figure 5: Evolution of Fiscal Rule Indices, 1985-2012 (Country Averages)
covering the general framework is 0.64.
5. Application II: Effects of Fiscal Rules
In the following, we compare the results from an estimation of the effects of fiscal rules
on fiscal outcomes using the POSET indices calculated in Section 4 with those replicated
from a previous study using a composite index approach. Given the quite recent release
of the IMF data on fiscal rules in 2012, there are hardly any econometric studies that
build exactly on this database.16
In the following, we focus on the paper by Debrun et al. (2008), a recent and often
cited paper, which is - to our knowledge - also the study employing the largest panel
in an econometric study on fiscal rules. They investigate the effect of fiscal rules on
public finances of the EU25 over the period 1990 to 2005, using a composite index based
on (unpublished) IMF data that matches the information contained in the IMF Fiscal
Rules Dataset very closely. Their measure of the stringency of fiscal rules is based on five
16There are several studies looking at EU countries (European Commission, 2006; Deroose et al., 2006;
Debrun and Kumar, 2007) or emerging countries (Kopits, 2004; Corbacho and Schwartz, 2007). These
studies, however, are not well suited for a comparative analysis, since they are based on other databases
that do not match the information in the IMF dataset, typically use only a small sample of countries,
and refer to earlier time periods.
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properties, which are assigned values ranging from 1 to 4 and then rescaled and summed
up to a composite index.17
In a first step, we replicate the results of Debrun et al. (2008) for their sample of the
EU25 countries over the period 1990 to 2005. Since the data underlying their indices are
not available, we use the composite fiscal rules indices by Schaechter et al. (2012). These
are based on the published IMF Fiscal Rules Dataset and constructed in the same way
as the ones in Debrun et al. (2008), using essentially the same properties.
The results obtained using composite indices by Schaechter et al. (2012) serve as a
benchmark and will be compared to the corresponding regression results based on the
POSET indices introduced in the present paper, which are also based on the IMF Fiscal
Rules Dataset. Second, given the larger country and time country coverage of the IMF
Fiscal Rules dataset, we extend their regression analysis for the EU25 countries over the
period 1990 to 2005 (243 observations) to the largest sample possible, which is made up
of 81 countries over the period 1985 to 2012 (851 observations).
Our empirical panel data model follows exactly the (dynamic) specification in Debrun
et al. (2008), who regress countries’ overall budget balance (bb) on their fiscal rules index
and a set of control variables (x) (and country-specific fixed effects (µi)):18
bbi,t = αbbi,t−1 + γRi,t + xi,tβ + µi + i,t, (4)
where i is the country index and t is the year index; in Debrun et al. (2008), the cross-
section dimension comprises the EU25 countries and the time dimension ranges from
1990 to 2005, yielding a total of 243 observations. As an index for the stringency fiscal
rules index (R), we first use the composite fiscal rules index by Schaechter et al. (2012)
based on the IMF Fiscal Rules dataset (which is very close to the index used by Debrun
et al., 2008), and then compare the results with those obtained using our POSET indices
introduced above. In line with Debrun et al. (2008), we focus on balanced budget rules
here, i.e., we use the respective composite index and the POSET index RBR+ in the
regression analysis.
The control variables (x) included in Equation (4) are: i) lagged real GDP growth
(in Debrun et al. (2008) the output gap is used, but this variable is not available for
17E.g., property ‘Statutory base of the rule’ assigns a scores of 4 for a constitutional basis, 3 for a legal
act, 2 for a coalition agreement, and 1 for political commitment. Another property is the ‘body in
charge of monitoring the rule’ with a score of 3 in case of an independent authority, 2 for the Ministry of
Finance and 1 for no public monitoring. The scores for each of the five features are then re-normalized
to have the same maximum and afterwards summed up using equal weights. For a detailed description,
see Debrun et al. (2008), page 351.
18Debrun et al. (2008) also use the cyclically adjusted primary balance as dependent variable; for reasons
of data availability (especially for countries other than the OECD countries) we consider only the
specification with the overall budget balance as dependent variable here.
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most of the countries), ii) government stability (index from the International Country
Risk Guide by the PRS Group), iii) government fragmentation (sum of squared seat
shares of all parties in government), iv) district magnitude (average parliament seats
per electoral district), v) ideology (index of conservatism of government), vi) ideological
range (difference between extreme ideologies in government), vii) parliamentary election
(dummy for legislative election years), viii) run-up to EMU (dummy for the EU15 from
1995 to 1997), ix) monetary union (Debrun et al., 2008 use only a dummy for the Stability
and Growth Pact, but in our extended sample there are (will also be) other countries in
monetary unions) and x) country size (population). Finally, i,t is an idiosyncratic error
term. A detailed descripition of the variables and data sources is given in Appendix A.2.
As in Debrun et al. (2008), all estimations are carried out using the bias corrected
LSDV estimator by Kiviet (1995) for unbalanced panels as described in Bruno (2005).
The first column of Table 5 shows the estimation results as presented in Debrun et al.
(2008) and column (2) the replication using the same sample, i.e. EU countries from 1990
to 2005, and the composite (balanced budget rule) index by Schaechter et al. (2012). In
terms of statistical significance, the results of these two specifications are very close in
light of the slight difference in the construction of the fiscal rules index. Column (5)
estimates the same specification using the POSET (balanced budget rule) index of fiscal
rules (RBR+). Comparing, the results in columns (2) and (5), both the IMF index and
the POSET index turn out significant at the 5% level, indicating that stronger fiscal
frameworks lead to higher overall public balances. This is not too surprising in light
of the facht, that the correlation between the IMF balanced budget rule index and the
POSET counterpart amounts to 0.97.
Given that the estimation of the effects of fiscal rules on fiscal outcomes might be
prone to endogeneity issues (that have to be addressed in future research), we do not
wish to overemphasize the quantitative findings. However, for the purpose of the present
paper it is of interest to compare the estimates of the specifications using the composite
(IMF) index approach and the POSET approach. According to the estimates in columns
(2) and (5), a one standard deviation increase in the stringency of fiscal rules, implies a
short-run improvement of the budget balance by 0.05 percentage points (IMF index) and
of 0.03 percentage points (POSET). The corresponding long-run effects implied by the
dynamic specification amount to 0.16 and 0.12 percentage points, respectively. Hence,
the point estimate of the specification using the POSET approach, while leading to no
change in the statistical significance in the present sample (apparently due to its high
correlation with the IMF index) points to a smaller economic significance of fiscal rules
as determinants of fiscal outcomes.
Notwithstanding these differences in the point estimates of the effects of fiscal rules, the
high correlation of the two indices deserves some discussion. As outlined in Section 3.2.1,
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there is always one weighting scheme that implies equivalence between the composite and
the POSET index (Brüggemann et al., 2001). Coincidentally, in the present sample it
happens to be the case that the IMF index by Schaechter et al. (2012), using equal
weights for the different properties, is quite close to this particular weighting scheme.
This provides an additional justification for the use of the IMF index in the sense that
it is quite close to the one based on the POSET approach, which has a more general
foundation. Of course, this does not imply that composite indices will generally be very
close to the corresponding POSET indices.
To demonstrate the sensitivity with respect to alternative weighting schemes, we pro-
vide a simple simulation exercise and recalculate the IMF balanced budget rule index
using alternative weights; in particular, we calculate 100, 000 composite indices using al-
ternative weights for the four main components (legal foundation, coverage, enforcement
institution, general framework), where the weights are drawn from the (0, 1) uniform dis-
tribution (and then rescaled such that they sum to one). The average correlation between
the POSET index RBR+ and the simulated indices amounts to 0.42 and spans a range
from 0.30 to 0.54. Figure A6 in Appendix A.3 shows the histogram of the correlations.19
This suggests that the high correlation between the composite and the POSET paper
obtained in the present paper is in fact rather the exception than the rule.
In a next step, we extend the time coverage of the sample and reestimate Equation
(4) using the full time period for which data are available for the EU25 countries, namely
1985 to 2012. The results turn out to be very similar, the only difference being that one
control variable (GDP growth) becomes highly significant. Most interesting here is that
the fiscal rules indices remains significant and that the IMF version becomes even more
significant. Columns (4) and (7) extend the country coverage further, including all 81
countries (and the full period from 1985-2012) and using the IMF composite index and
the POSET version, respectively. First, we observe that all variables other than the
fiscal rules index become insignificant, suggesting that the control variables which are
standard in the literature on fiscal reaction functions are mostly relevant for developed
(EU) countries. Morover, the much lower R2 indicates that in a broader country sample
there are also additional factors driving public finances. However, both fiscal rules indices
remain significant, though the POEST index enters the regression at a higher significance
level than the IMF composite index.
19This issue is pursued further in Bachtrögler et al. (2014), who calculate composite and POSET indices,
based on data from the OECD Budget Practices and Procedures survey (2007/2008). This database is
not used here;. Its main shortcoming for the use in econometric analyses is that it just refers to a single
year; on the other hand, its main advantage is that it contains a lot of detailed information on fiscal
regimes that allows the replication of other fiscal indices used in previous studies that contain more
or different information than the IMF database. Bachtrögler et al. (2014) replicate several composite
indices used in previous studies based on the OECD database and calculate the corresponding POSET
indices. It turns out that there is substantial variation in the correlation between the composite indices
and their POSET counterparts, ranging from 0.3 to (close to) 1.
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6. Conclusions
This paper makes use of partially ordered set theory (POSET) to calculate new
indices of numerical fiscal rules for 81 countries from 1985 to 2012 based on IMF (2012).
We argue that the POSET method is an attractive approach that can be used as an
alternative to composite indices. It is applicable in many fields of the social sciences to
generate summary indicators of institutional characteristics that can only be described
in terms of ordinal and a priori incomparable properties.
The POSET measures of (the stringency) of fiscal rules show that the use of fiscal
rules has increased substantially over the last 20 years, though their stringency varies
widely among countries. Also, within the group of countries with relatively stringent
rules, there is heterogeneity in the type of rule applied. This provides a valuable source
of variation to investigate the determinants and the effects of fiscal rules.
As a simple application, the POSET indices are then used to estimate the effects
of fiscal rules on fiscal outcomes (in terms of the overall budget balance) for the EU25
countries over the period 1990-2005, following the study by Debrun et al. (2008), who
use a composite index approach. The weighting scheme chosen by Debrun et al. (2008)
yields a composite index that is quite close to the POSET index; as a consequence, the
results using these two alternative measures of fiscal rules produce similar results and
point to a positive effect of balanced budget rules on countries’ overall fiscal balance.
Exploiting the larger country and time coverage of the IMF database used in the present
paper, we extend the regression to a sample of 81 countries over the period 1985 to 2012
and show that this result also holds up more generally in this broader sample.
From a policy perspective, an open question relates to the optimal design of fiscal
rules for achieving the desired outcomes. Hence, the implications and the effectiveness
of alternative types of fiscal rules are important issues that remain to be addressed in
future research. The POSET indices of fiscal rules suggested in this paper provide a
comprehensive dataset that can be used for that purpose.
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Appendix.
A.1. Summary Statistics by Country Group
Table A6: Summary Statistics for Full POSET Indices by Country Group
Index All Advanced Emerging Low-Income Resource-Rich EU27
RBR 0.162 0.272 0.146 0.026 0.154 0.196
RBR+ 0.157 0.261 0.147 0.023 0.155 0.192
RDR 0.087 0.093 0.120 0.029 0.061 0.111
RDR+ 0.088 0.105 0.118 0.020 0.060 0.117
RER 0.097 0.178 0.081 0.004 0.081 0.176
RER+ 0.099 0.182 0.083 0.004 0.086 0.177
RRR 0.028 0.063 0.006 0.011 0.000 0.062
RRR+ 0.028 0.065 0.007 0.007 0.001 0.062
RG 0.147 0.237 0.140 0.030 0.139 0.199
Observations 2,268 840 840 588 448 705
Notes: Mean of Indices; Classification according to IMF Fiscal Rules dataset (2012)
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A.2. Data Sources
Table A7: Data Sources for Estimation of Fiscal Reaction Function
Variable Explanation Source
Budget Balance Surplus of general gov-
ernment (% of GDP)
International Mone-
tary Fund - World
Economic Outlook -
General government net
lending/borrowing
Country Size (Population) Total population Worldbank - World
Development Indica-
tors - Population total,
SP.POP.TOTL
Debt to GDP ratio International Monetary
Fund - World Economic
Outlook Database -
General government
gross debt
District Magnitude Number of legislators
elected in the average
district in a country
Worldbank - Database
of Political Institutions
2012, Average of Mean
District Magnitude
(MDM), House and
Senate
Gov. Fragmentation Sum of squared seat
shares of all parties in
the government
Own calculations with
Worldbank - Database
of Political Institutions
2012
Government Stability International Country
Risk Guide by the PRS
Group
Ideology Index of conservatism of
government
Worldbank - Database
of Political Institutions
2012
Ideological Range Difference between ex-
treme ideologies in gov-
ernment
Worldbank - Database
of Political Institutions
2012
Monetary Union 1 if in currency union, 0
otherwise
Authors input
Parliamentary Election Dummy for legislative
election years
Worldbank - Database
of Political Institutions
2012
Real GDP Growth Real Growth of Gross
Domestic Product (Per-
centage change)
International Monetary
Fund - World Eco-
nomic Outlook - Gross
domestic product, con-
stant prices, percentage
change
Run-up to EMU Dummy for the EU15
from 1995 to 1997
Authors input
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A.3. Comparison of Composite and POSET indices
Figure A6: Correlations between simulated composite indices and POSET index
(RBR+).
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